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PUBLIC RELIEF
N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1:
The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and
shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and
in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from
time to time determine.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Childs v. Bane 17
62
(decided December 16, 1993)
Plaintiffs claimed that they had standing to "prevent the
wrongful expenditure, misappropriation... or any other illegal
or unconstitutional disbursement of state funds" 1763 based on
State Finance Law section 123-b. 17 64 Plaintiffs also contended
that there was a violation of the New York State Constitution1 765
because "the denial of assistance to an applicant who has not
complied with a repayment agreement constitutes a blanket
elimination of benefits to persons in need of aid." 1766
Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that their right to equal
protection pursuant to both the New York State1 767 and Federal
1762. 194 A.D.2d 221, 605 N.Y.S.2d 488 (3d Dep't 1993).
1763. Id. at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (citing N.Y. FIN. LAW § 123-b)
(McKinney 1993)).
1764. N.Y. FIN. LAw § 123-b.
1765. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. This section states that "the aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the
state... ." Id.
1766. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1767. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part:
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Constitutions 1768 was violated. 1769 The Appellate Division,
Third Department held that Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
had standing to maintain the proposed expenditure of state
funds. 1770 The court further held that denying assistance to those
applicants who had not signed a repayment agreement was
constitutional on two grounds. 177 1 First, the state had the
discretion to determine who was eligible for state aid and the
amount of aid that person is entitled to. 1772 Second, the court
ruled that once an applicant became eligible for public assistance,
they could still apply for and receive state funds "even though
they may have defaulted upon a previously executed repayment
agreement." ' 1773 Finally, the court held that requiring signed
repayment plans furthers the state's legitimate goal of providing
limited assistance to the neediest individuals. 1774
Utility customers and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
filed suit to challenge an administrative directive and an amended
regulation to 18 N.Y.C.R.R. 352.5(d) 1775 promulgated by the
State Commissioner of Social Services in response to New York
1768. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No state shall make or enforce any law ... [that will) deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
1769. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1770. Id. at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
1771. Id.
1772. Id. at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1773. Id.
1774. Id. at 225-26, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1775. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 352.5(d) (1992). Section
352.5(d) provides in pertinent part: "A payment must be made for utilities
previously provided to an applicant for ... emergency public assistance if
such payment is essential to continue or restore utility service . . . ." Id. The
amended regulation to N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.5(d)
states that "assistance cannot be provided to an applicant whose gross
household income exceeds the public assistance standard of need for the same
sized household unless he or she signs a repayment agreement." Childs, 194
A.D.2d at 224, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 490. The amendment also provides that "an
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Social Services Law section 131-s, 1776 which set forth the
eligibility requirements for utility service assistance. Plaintiff
maintained that the administrative directive and amended
regulation violated the New York Constitution by eliminating
benefits to all persons in need of aid. 1777
The first constitutional issue the court addressed was whether
plaintiff, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, had standing as a
taxpayer to bring an action for declaratory relief under State
Finance Law section 123-b. 1778 The defendant alleged that, since
the amended regulation did not constitute an expenditure of state
funds, Niagara Mohawk did not have standing to bring the
action. 1779 However, in relying on Community Service Society v.
Cuomo, 1780 the court held that Niagara Mohawk had standing to
bring suit because "[a]lthough the promulgation of the amended
regulation and [the administrative directive] did not involve the
expenditure of state funds, their implementation will."1781
Therefore, since Niagara Mohawk alleged that the expenditure of
1776. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-s (McKinney 1993). This section states
in relevant part:
In the case of a person applying for public assistance, supplemental
security income benefits of additional state payments pursuant to this
chapter, the social services official of the social services
district... [shall] ... make a payment to a gas corporation, electric
corporation ... during a period of up to, but not exceeding, four
months... if such payment is needed to prevent shut-off or to restore
service.
Id.
1777. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1778. Id. at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
1779. Id.
1780. 167 A.D.2d 168, 561 N.Y.S.2d 461 (lst Dep't 1990). In Cuomo, the
court rejected the argument that no taxpayer may bring an action under State
Finance Law § 123-b when the challenge does not involve "the direct
expenditure of state funds." Id. at 170, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 463-64. The court
held that where there was a challenge to the "promulgation
of... regulations... involv[ing] the expenditure -of state funds," and there
were sufficient allegations "to constitute a proper challenge to ... a 'wrongful
expenditure... '" thus, plaintiff had standing. Id.
1781. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (emphasis added).
19941 1117
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funds might lead to an "unconstitutional disbursement and
misapplication of state funds," it had standing to file suit. 1782
Under federal law, however, Niagara Mohawk would not have
standing to sue as a taxpayer. Whether a plaintiff has federal
standing as a taxpayer is governed by Article III of the United
States Constitution. 1783 Article III limits federal courts to hear
"cases" and "controversies." 1784 In Valley Forge v. Americans
United,1785 the United States Supreme Court recognized that
"'the interests of a taxpayer are too indeterminable, remote,
uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for an appeal to the
preventive powers of the Court over their manner of
expenditure'" 1786 and upheld a two-part test, defined in Flast v.
Cohen. 1787 The Flast test assesses whether a taxpayer has federal
standing. First, "'a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the
unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power
under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8 of the
Constitution.'" 1788 Second, a taxpayer must "'show that the
challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations
upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power and not
simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers
1782. Id.
1783. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III, § 2 states in pertinent part: "The
judicial power shall extend to all [c]ases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority . . . ." Id.
1784. Id. Federal law requires that a litigant must "show he personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant," as well as have a "redress[able injury] by a
favorable decision." Valley Forge v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982).
1785. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In Valley Forge, an organization concerned for
separation of church and state lacked standing as a taxpayer to bring suit
against the federal government for transferring property to a religious
organization without financial payment because the source of plaintiffs
complaint was not a congressional action nor "an exercise of authority
conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8." Id. at 480.
1786. Id. at 478 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
1787. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
1788. Id. at 102.
1118 [Vol 10
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delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. ' "1789 Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a federal plaintiff's
generalized grievance will not satisfy the requirements of
standing. 1790
It is clear that "taxpayer standing has been treated liberally" in
New York State. 179 1 Thus, it follows from Valley Forge that
plaintiffs who sue in federal court as taxpayers, have a more
difficult time establishing standing than if the same plaintiffs
were to challenge an economic or social welfare statute in state
court.
The Appellate Division, Third Department found that the
amended regulation and administrative directive violated the New
York Constitutional mandate that "the aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the
State ... ."1792 Relying on Tucker v. Toia,1793  plaintiff
contended that requiring an applicant to sign a repayment plan
limited the number of applicants who would benefit from New
York Social Services Law section 131-s and was in direct
contradiction with the New York State Constitution 1794 because it
was a "blanket elimination of benefits to persons in need of
aid."1795
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that the plaintiff's
reliance on Tucker was misguided. 1796 The court relied on
1789. Id. at 102-03.
1790. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486.
1791. Community Serv. Soc'y v. Cuomo, 167 A.D.2d 168, 170, 561
N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (lst Dep't 1990).
1792. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (citing N.Y. CONST.
art. XVII, § 11).
1793. 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977).
1794. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1795. Id.
1796. Id. While the court held in Tucker that New York refused to aid those
who the state had classified as needy, 43 N.Y.2d at 8, 371 N.E.2d at 452, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 731, the court, in Childs, held that by requiring signed payment
plans, the state was not refusing to aid those who were classified as eligible for
public assistance. 194 A.D.2d at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1994] 1119
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Lovelace v. Gross1797 to substantiate its conclusion that the
amended regulation and administrative directive were
constitutional. 1798 By upholding the proposition espoused in both
Lovelace and Tucker, 1799  the amended regulation and
administrative directive only denied assistance "to persons who
d[id] not fall within the statutory definition of needy because their
household income exceed[ed] the public assistance standard of
need .... " 1800 Furthermore, the record showed that once an
individual became eligible for public assistance because of his or
her low income, the applicant could still receive public assistance
even where he or she "may have defaulted upon a previously
executed repayment agreement." 180 1 Thus, the court ruled that
the amended regulation and administrative directive did not
violate article XVII, section 1 of the New York Constitution. 1802
Finally, the court held that the amended regulation and
administrative directive did not violate the Equal Protection
1797. 80 N.Y.2d 419, 605 N.E.2d 339, 590 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1992). In
Lovelace, a statute limited the amount of public assistance applicants could
receive by creating the "grandparent-deeming rule," which required that a part
of the "grandparents' income be deemed available to the [applicants] in
determining their eligibility for Home Relief payments." Id. at 422, 605
N.E.2d at 340, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 853. The court upheld the law, and
recognized that although "assisting the needy is a matter of constitutional
command[,]" the New York Constitution "vests the legislature with discretion
'in determining the amount of aid and in classifying recipients and defining the
term of need.'" Id. at 424, 605 N.E.2d at 341, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (citations
omitted). Since the grandparent-deeming rule was not a complete bar to public
assistance and since an applicant was still eligible for assistance where
"available income still falls below the standard of need," the legislative
modification of the term "needy" was within the discretion of the legislature,
and therefore, constitutional. Id. at 426, 605 N.E.2d at 342, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
852.
1798. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 225, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1799. The principle espoused in these two cases is that the state legislature
has discretion in determining who can collect public assistance, as well as what
characteristics determine the standard of need. Lovelace, 80 N.Y.2d at 424,
605 N.E.2d at 342, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 855; Tucker, 43 N.Y.2d at 8, 371
N.E.2d at 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
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Clause of the New York Constitution. 1803 In reaching its
conclusion the court relied on Jones v. Blum. 1804 In Jones, the
court stated that providing a "cutoff point" in determining
neediness is "rationally related to the legitimate goals
of... allocating limited welfare funds to the neediest of
applicants." 180 5 Similarly, in Childs, the court determined that
the state had a "legitimate goal of allocating limited public
assistance resources to the neediest applicants" 1806 and requiring
repayment plans was well within the discretion of the State
Commissioner. 
1807
1803. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
1804. 101 A.D.2d 330, 476 N.Y.S.2d 214 (3d Dep't 1984), af'd, 64
N.Y.2d 918, 477 N.E.2d 620, 488 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1985). In Jones, the court
held that a 150% gross income rule used to define "needy" in determining the
eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, does not violate the
equal protection clause of the New York Constitution. Id. at 333, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 217. The 150% gross income rule "assumes that individuals
whose gross income exceeds 150% of the established standard of need are
capable of self-support. . . ." Id. at 333, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 216. The court
eventually held that "[a] state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution
simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or
because ... it results in some inequality.'" Id. at 334, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 217
(quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
1805. Id. at 334, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
1806. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 226, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1807. Id. The court stated that "the Commissioner's power to deny assistance
is derived by implication from the statutory requirement which conditions the
receipt of assistance upon the signing of a repayment plan." Id. Furthermore,
the court said that "[w]ithout the power to deny assistance, the repayment
agreement would be rendered essentially meaningless as it could be ignored
with impunity because the failure to abide by it would have no immediate
consequences." Id.
The court also found that the definition of "household" and "standard of
need" did not "impermissibly expand the number of applicants required to sign
repayment agreements." Id. Since the Commissioner's amended definition of
household, found in 18 N.Y.C.R.R. 352.5(d), "was in accord with the
commonly understood meaning of 'household,'" the court stated that the
definition was rational. Id.; see also Bates v. Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 460, 464, 382
N.E.2d 1128, 1129, 410 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (1978) (holding that where the
1994] 1121
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Both New York and federal courts apply a rational relationship
test to social welfare or economic statutes in assessing whether
the Equal Protection Clause has been violated. Thus, there must
be a rational relationship between the means and the legislative
objective. 1808 For example, the Supreme Court held, in
Dandridge v. Williams, 1809 that "[in] the area of economics and
social welfare, a [s]tate does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect." 1810  As long as the classification has some
"reasonable basis," the Supreme Court will not strike down state
laws that create such classifications for public assistance
programs. 18 11 Thus, the administrative directive and amended
regulation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.
After addressing several other administrative issues, 1812 the
court concluded that there was neither a violation of the New
commissioner's construction of the relevant statutes "is not irrational or
arbitrary, judicial inquiry is foreclosed").
1808. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992) (holding that
proposed amendment to state constitution in which longer-term property
owners pay lower property taxes than newer owners was rationally related to
the legitimate state interest of preserving neighborhoods).
1809. 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (holding that a Maryland maximum grant
regulation which places an absolute limit of $250 per month on the amount of a
grant under AFDC regardless of the size of the family and its actual need does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
1810. Id. at 485.
1811. Id.
1812. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 226-28, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 491-92. The court
held that the amendment to 18 N.Y.C.R.R. 352.5(d), which defined the
standard of need including 18 N.Y.C.R.R. 352.1(a) and (b), but not (c) and
which increased the number of applicants who will have to participate in the
repayment agreements, is consistent with the Laws of 1992 (ch. 41, § 165[p]).
Id. at 227, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 492. The Laws of 1992, ch. 41, § 165[p] allows
the Commissioner to promulgate regulations including the determination of
client eligibility "to meet emergency circumstances." Id. The court ruled that
"because the Legislature clearly envisioned a narrowing of the eligibility
standards as a means of achieving savings ... the [amended] definition of
standard of need ... is reasonable." Id.; see Lovelace v. Gross, 80 N.Y.2d
419, 422 605 N.E.2d 339, 590 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1992) (stating that the
Legislature, in having discretion to determine the amount of aid and to define
1122 [Vol 10
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York Constitutional mandate of providing assistance for the
needy, nor a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 1813
Therefore, it follows that the federal court system applies a
more stringent test for taxpayer standing than do New York
courts. With regard to economic and social welfare statutes,
although there is no federal constitutional mandate to provide for
the needy, both state and federal constitutions allow legislatures
the necessary discretion in adopting social welfare programs
where there is a legitimate state purpose and a rational
relationship between the state goal and the means to achieve that
goal.
the term "needy," "'may continue the system of relief now in operation [or] it
may devise new ways of dealing with the problem... [so long as it does not]
shirk its responsibilit[ies]'") (citations omitted); Beer Garden v. New York
State Liquor Auth., 79 N.Y.2d 266, 276, 590 N.E.2d 1193, 1197, 582
N.Y.S.2d 65, 69 (1992) (holding that when "broad rule-making authority has
been granted, an agency cannot 'promulgate rules in contravention of the will
of the Legislature'") (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court held that "the
additional costs of meals for persons unable to prepare meals at home, [wa]s
specifically required by Social Services Law § 131-a (2)(b) [and] to be
included in the determination of standard of need." Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 227,
606 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Also, the court said that determining eligibility under
Social Services Law § 131-s is to be based upon one's income rather than
gross income, thus invalidating 18 N.Y.C.R.R. 352.5(d) "as it employs a
gross household income standard." Id. at 228, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
Moreover, the court held that enforcing the repayment plans by "recoup[ing]
from public assistance grants and garnish[ing] of the wages of the household
members which the Commissioner has limited to the wages of the recipient's
spouse" was invalid. Id. Finally, the court ruled that the administrative
directive and the repayment agreements did not have to be "published in the
State Register. . . .".Id.
1813. Childs, 194 A.D.2d at 225, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
1994] 1123
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